We find quantum mechanics playing a role in evolutionary dynamics described by the notion of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). An ESS being a refinement of Nash equilibrium concept is a stable strategy in an evolutionary game with replicator dynamic as the underlying process. We investigate ESSs in two and three player symmetric quantum games played by the proposed scheme of applying ′ identity ′ and ′ Pauli spin-flip ′ operators on an initial state with classical probabilities. The mixed Nash equilibrium (NE) we search for is not affected by a switchover between two forms of the game, one quantized and other classical, however it is an ESS when the game is played classically.We show no such mixed NE exists for two player games but there is a class of three player games where they do exist.Our results imply that an evolutionary approach originating with Darwin's idea of natural selection can be used even for quantum systems. It also indicates the possibility of genetic algorithms utilizing quantum effects.
Introduction
Nash equilibrium (NE), an idea developed from the analysis of non-cooperative games, is such an equilibrium that a unilateral deviation from it leads to decrease in payoff. Game theorists explained evolution of complex behavior by further refinements of NE concept and the set of refinements became so large that eventually almost any NE could be justified in terms of someone or other's refinement [13] .Game theorist's attention was diverted away from elaborate definitions of rationality by Maynard Smith's book Evolution and the Theory of Games where he presented what is now called evolutionary approach. An evolutionary approach can be seen as a large population model of adjustment to a NE i.e. an adjustment of population segments by evolution as opposed to learning. Maynard Smith introduced the idea of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in a seminal paper 'The logic of animal conflict' [5] . In rough terms, an ESS is a strategy which, if played by almost all members of a population, cannot be displaced by a small invading group playing any alternative strategy. In the usual notation P (x, y) gives the payoff to a x player against y player. A strategy x is said to be an ESS if for any alternative strategy y following requirements are satisfied: 1. P (x, x) > P (y, x)
2. If P (x, x) = P (y, x) then P (x, y) > P (y, y)
From this definition an ESS is a strategy which does well against copies of itself. A successful strategy is one, which dominates the population; therefore it will tend to meet copies of itself. Conversely, if it is not successful against copies of itself, it will not dominate the population. An ESS will persist as the dominant strategy through time, so that strategies observed in the real world will tend to be ESSs.
ESSs are symmetric NE with an additional property usually called stability. Every ESS is a NE but not conversely. The first condition of an ESS is the NE condition for a symmetric game.
The evolutionary approach based on Darwin's idea of natural selection can be formulated as an algorithm called replicator dynamic. Iterations of selections from randomly mutating replicators is an essential feature of the dynamic. The idea has been extensively used in mathematical biology to explain complex behavioral strategies employed by even simple forms of life to continue their existence and exploit their environment efficiently. Speaking the language of game theory the replicator dynamic says that in a population the proportion of players which play better strategies increase with time. When replicator dynamic is the underlying process of a game the ESSs are stable against perturbations [21] .
The idea of an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) has recently been extended to quantum domain by Iqbal and Toor [3] for two player quantum games. The invasion by mutants utilizing two parameter set of quantum strategies considered by Iqbal and Toor [3] is a situation where the mutants are in possession of a better strategy space. In the new strategy space exploited by mutants the prevailing classical ESS does not even remain a NE and the invasion is not so unusual. By giving the mutants a better strategy space does not show that the theory of ESS has some relevance in quantum game theory. For such a relevance to exist Iqbal and Toor [3] proposed that the quantum strategies should be able to upset the stability of an existing NE, expressed by the idea of ESS, assuming that the same NE exists in both classical and quantum version of a game. The scheme they utilized has been suggested by Marinatto and Weber [1] . for a two player game of Battle of Sexes. The reason to use this scheme to find ESSs in quantum games being that the notions of a mixed Nash equilibrium (NE) and mixed ESS from evolutionary game theory can be easily extended towards quantum games by treating them as new strategies and then defining fitness in the usual manner of evolutionary game theory. In Marinatto and weber's scheme the players apply their 'tactics' by selecting the identity I and Pauli spin-flip operator σ x with classical probabilities, a procedure similar to probabilistic choice between 'pure strategies' in evolutionary game theory. So that application of I and σ x was treated as pure strategies of evolutionary setting. The classical game can be reproduced by using the unentangled initial state [1] . Iqbal and Toor [3] showed that an ESS pair can be made to appear or disappear on choice in certain types of asymmetric games played between two players by maneuvering the initial entangled state while retaining the corresponding NE. Similar procedure can also be done in a class of symmetric games [4] played between two players making it more appropriate because the notion of an ESS was originally defined [5] for pairwise symmetric contests.
In Marinatto and Weber's scheme the players have not access to all quantum mechanically possible actions. However, in this scheme the most important aspect of a quantum game still holds i.e. the classical game is embedded in the quantum game and classical payoffs can be recovered by using an unentangled initial state to play the game. We do not feel it absolutely necessary that players should always be in possession of all quantum mechanically possible actions even though it can render better insight. The kind of situations for which we want to use quantum game theory as a modelling tool the players are not necessarily in possession of every imaginable quantum action. For example the stereochemical explanation for the formation of the genetic code says that an optimized code results from straightforward chemical affinities between individual amino acids and their corresponding condons. When amino acids and condons are taken as players and their chemical affinities defining constants of a quantum game it is not always necessary that the players must be at the disposal every possible quantum action. We agree with Marinatto and Weber that a 'minimal choice' enough to reproduce intact the classical results is the sole requirement [2] to show the difference generated by the quantum effects and our object remains the same. An improvement based on enlarging the class of allowed manipulations is underway.
In evolutionary game theory the concept of an ESS has been extended to multiplayer games [6] Recently Simon et al [7] have extended the quantum games to more than two players. Earlier they reported [8] that no maximally entangled two-player quantum game can have equilibria when the strategy space is SU. However coherent equilibria do occur for multiplayer case [7] and it provided us a motivation to extend the idea of ESS to multi-player quantum games as well. Simon et al considered multi-player games to find equilibria when player can use strategies from the set SU and a consideration of ESSs, constituting a subset of the set of all NE, in multiplayer quantum games will be more appropriate with players having access to SU. However in this paper to gain some insight into the problem we extend the idea of ESS to three players game played via Marinatto and Weber's scheme.
Our purpose in this paper is to explore the behavior of the mixed NE appearing as solutions of the game from the point of view of ESSs. Our motivation to focus on mixed strategies is that the set of 'continuously stable' strategies forms a subset of the set of mixed strategies at least for two-player symmetric contests [18] [19] . Continuous stability is a refinement of evolutionary stability.
We could not find analysis of the continuous stability in three player symmetric contests but in our opinion similar to two player case continuously stable strategies should be mixed too in this case.
When we say an ESS cannot be invaded we mean that it cannot be invaded by another known strategy. ESS is always defined against other known alternative strategies and it is always potentially vulnerable to any new strategy that might come along. The invasion by quantum strategies in the classical pairwise game of Prisoner's Dilemma [3] when Defection exists as an ESS is such an example.
Two player case
Consider a two player symmetric game given by the matrix:
Bob's Strategy
The unitary and Hermitian operator C is defined as [1] :
Let one of the players apply his 'tactics' by implementing the identity operator I with probability p and C with probability (1−p) and the second player applies I with probability q and C with probability (1 − q). The final density matrix is written as [1] : and the other entangled (|b| 2 = 0), can not be an ESS in only one form of the game. However, the pure strategy p = 0 is an ESS when:
Similarly the pure strategy p = 1 is an ESS when:
Also
is NE condition. Now because the ESS conditions for both of the pure strategies p = 1 and p = 0 depend on |b| 2 , therefore, there can be examples of two player symmetric games for which p = 0 or p = 1 remains an ESS for only one form of the game. We can say that only pure ESSs can be made to appear or disappear via a control on the initial state in two player symmetric games. Examples of the games with this property are easy to find. A class of games for which γ = α and (β − δ) < 0, gives symmetric two player games for which the strategies p = 0 and p = 1 remain NE for all |b| 2 ∈ [0, 1] but the strategy p = 1 is not an ESS when |b| 2 = 0 and the strategy p = 0 is not an ESS at |b| 2 = 1. Example of a class of games for which a pure strategy forming an ESS classically does not remain ESS for some particular value for |b| 2 but still being NE for all possible |b| 2 is given by Iqbal and Toor [4] .
Three player case
Similar to two player case we assume three players apply their 'tactics' by implementing the identity operator I with probabilities p, q and r respectively and the operator C with probabilities (1 − p), (1 − q) and (1 − r) respectively on the initial state |ψ in . It gives rise to the final density matrix:
Basic vectors of three player entangled set of strategies are:
We use the initial state: |ψ in = a |S 1 S 1 S 1 +b |S 2 S 2 S 2 , where |a| 2 + |b| 2 = 1.Associated density matrix:
Payoff operators for players A, B, and C are:
Where the 24 constants α i , β i , η i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 8 define the matrix of the three player game. Payoffs to players A, B, and C are:
Here similar to two player case the classical payoffs can be obtained by making initial state unentangled and fixing |b| 2 = 0. To make the game symmetric let define P A (x, y, z) be the payoff to player A when players A, B, and C play the strategies x,y and z respectively. Following relations make payoffs to players an identity independent quantity: 
Following replacements are then needed for β i are:
Similarly for η i the replacements are:
The concept of an ESS has been extended to multi-player case. When mutants are allowed to play only one strategy the definition of an ESS for three players case can be written as [14] : 1. P (p, p, p) > P (q, p, p) 2. If P (p, p, p) = P (q, p, p) then P (p, q, p) > P (q, q, p)
Note that p is a NE if it satisfies condition 1 against all q = p. Now for our case the conditions for the pure strategies The condition σ |b| 2 ≥ ω |a| 2 is NE condition for the strategy
The condition σ |a| 2 ≥ ω |b| 2 is NE condition for the strategy ⋆ p 3 = 1. Note that both the strategies Examples of three player symmetric games are easy to find for which a pure strategy is a NE for the whole range |b| 2 ∈ [0, 1] but not remaining an ESS for some specific value of |b| 2 . An example of a class of such games is for which σ = 0, ω < 0 and η ≤ 0. The strategy ⋆ p 2 = 0 is a NE for all |b| 2 ∈ [0, 1] but not an ESS when |b| 2 = 1.
However the mixed strategy NE ⋆ p 1 forms the most interesting case. It makes the payoff difference P ( p 1 ) 2 , of the quadratic equation:
only one can be an ESS for which P ( ⋆ p 1 , q, ⋆ p 1 ) − P (q, q, ⋆ p 1 ) > 0. When the above square root term becomes zero we have only one mixed NE that is not an ESS. Then, out of four possible NE in three player game only three can be ESSs.
An interesting class of three player games is one for which η 2 = σω for which the mixed NE are given as:
. For these games played classically we can get only one mixed NE that is not an ESS. However for all |b| 2 different from zero we generally obtain two NE out of which one can be an ESS. Similar to two player case, the NE in three player symmetric game important from the point of view of ESSs are those that can survive a change between two initial states, one being entangled and other unentangled. Suppose 
Now the difference P ( ⋆ p 1 , q, ⋆ p 1 )− P (q, q, ⋆ p 1 ) still depends on |b| 2 and becomes zero for |b| 2 = 1 2 . Therefore, for the class of games with σ = ω and η > σ the mixed strategies
remain NE for all |b| 2 ∈ [0, 1] but not ESS when |b| 2 = 1 2 . Note that the parameter |b| 2 is not effective to change the mixed NE and it remains same for whatever value is assigned to |b| 2 . However setting |b| 2 to 1 2 makes vanish whatever mixed ESSs are existing. Maneuvering the initial state can thus make disappear mixed ESSs in the class of three player symmetric games for which σ = ω and η > σ even when the corresponding mixed NE remain intact and are not disturbed by such a control of the initial state. No such example exists for the case of two player symmetric games.
Discussion
Classical games being played in nature macroscopically are known for a long time now. Evolutionary game theory is a subject growing out of such studies. Recent work in biology [20] suggests nature playing classical games at microlevel. Bacterial infections by viruses have been presented as classical game like situations where nature prefers the dominant strategies.
We have two suggestions where our findings about relations between ESSs and quantum games can have a relevance:
Genetic code evolution
Recent recent work [9] about the evolvability of the genetic code suggests that the code, like all other features of organisms, was shaped by natural selection. The question about the process and evolutionary mechanism by which the genetic code was optimized is still unanswered. Two major suggested possibilities are:
(a): A large number of codes existed out of which the adaptive one was selected.
(b): Adaptive and error-minimizing constraints gave rise to an adaptive code via code expansion and simplification.
The second possibility of code expansion from earlier simpler forms is now thought to be supported by much empirical and genetic evidence [11] . and results suggest that the present genetic code was strongly influenced by natural selection for error minimization.
Recently Patel [10] suggested quantum dynamics played a role in the DNA replication and the optimization criteria involved in genetic information processing. He considers the criteria involved as a task similar to an unsorted assembly operation where the Grover's database search algorithm [15] can fruitfully be applied given the different optimal solutions for classical and quantum dynamics. The assumption underlying this approach, as far we understood it, is that an adaptive code was selected out of a large numbers that existed earlier. Recent suggestions about natural selection being the processes for error minimization in the mechanism of adaptive code evolution imply an evolutionary approach for this optimization problem. Quantum dynamics has still a role to play even for the suggestion of code expansion from earlier simpler forms but the mechanism leading of optimization will be completely different. Current evidence suggesting natural selection playing a strong role [12] , though footprints of chemistry and biosythesis are not found yet, supports the view that evolutionary dynamics expressed by the idea of an ESS can be utilized fruitfully-in present efforts to explain the optimization of the code. Our finding about quantum mechanics playing a role in ESS theory indicated the optimization was probably controlled by quantum forces.
Quantum genetic algorithms
A polynomial time algorithm that can solve an NP problem is not known yet. A viable alternative approach shown to find acceptable solutions within a reasonable time period is the evolutionary search [22] . Iteration of selection based on competition, random variation usually called mutation, and exploration of the fitness landscape of possible solutions are the basic ingredients of many distinct paradigms of evolutionary computing [23] . On the other hand superposition of all possible solution states, unitary operator exploiting interference to enhance the amplitude of the desired states and final measurement extracting the solution are the components of quantum computing. These two approaches in computing are believed to represent different philosophies [24] . Finding ESSs can be easily formulated as an evolutionary algorithm with mutations occurring within only a small proportion of the total population. In fact ESSs also constitute an important technique in evolutionary computation. Our proposal that entanglement has a role in the theory of ESSs indicates the possibility of other evolutionary algorithms that utilize and exploit quantum effects.
Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that one of the central concept describing the dynamics of evolution called ESS can be related to entanglement believed to be a purely quantum phenomenon. We investigated ESSs in three player quantum games and compared it to two player games played by the proposed scheme of applying 'identity' and 'Pauli spin flip' operators on an initial state. In the two player symmetric game we found that a mixed ESS can not be made to disappear by a switchover to an entangled initial state when the corresponding NE remain intact for both forms of the game. However, for a class of three player symmetric games it is possible to do so. We suggest the physical systems for which our findings can possibly have a relevance to be the DNA molecule, genetic code and the recent findings about evolution at the dawn of life. Another possible relevance can be new genetic algorithms that exploit entangled states or even other quantum aspects. Our idea that quantum mechanics has a role to play in the theory of ESSs implies that Darwin's idea of natural selection can have a relevance even for quantum systems. We propose a quantum game theoretical approach involving the notion of ESS for the analysis of the questions about the optimization of genetic code against errors.
